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Abstract: According to recent research (Hattie, 2003), teachers contribute to around 30% of the overall variation 
in student achievement and success – more than any other influencing factor. This study seeks to understand how 
different types of incentives (monetary, near monetary and non-monetary incentives) influence the “effort” of 
public school teachers as perceived by the students in Lagos, Nigeria using a novel measurement tool – the 
teaching effectiveness survey – to measure the teachers’ outcomes. Using a randomized field experiment where 
students evaluate the changes in their teachers’ effort with a standard teaching effectiveness survey and differences 
in differences estimation, we show how incentives could potentially improve (or harm) teaching effectiveness. The 
results show that monetary incentives and near monetary incentives have no significant effect on “effort” while 
non-monetary incentives have a significant negative effect on the effort of teachers. This could imply that the 
issues underlying the current state of productivity of Public school teachers in Lagos State run deeper than 
remuneration or accountability. In the light of some limitations to this study, avenues for future research are 
multifold. 
 
 
Introduction 
Teaching is one of the most important professions in any society. According to the United Nations, 
quality teachers do not just improve test scores; they have long-term positive effects on the 
socioeconomic status of children 20 and 30 years down the line (UN, 2013). One question that many 
social scientists have tried to answer in recent times is how to improve teacher quality and performance, 
especially in developing countries where a larger set of challenges are faced by these professionals. This 
paper examines how both pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives influence teacher effort across 10 
Public Secondary Schools in Lagos Nigeria.  
About 85% of the world's children live in the developing world, and these children require quality 
education to thrive later on in life. Student learning in developing countries is often abysmal (Hanushek 
& Woessmann 2008), and many agree that student learning is highly reliant on teacher 
effort/productivity. A 2005 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Report 
aptly states that: 
“A point of agreement among the various studies is that there are many important aspects of teacher quality that 
are not captured by the commonly used indicators such as qualifications, experience and tests of academic ability. 
The teacher characteristics that are harder to measure, but which can be vital to student learning include the ability 
to convey ideas in clear and convincing ways; to create effective learning environments for different types of 
students; to foster productive teacher-student relationships; to be enthusiastic and creative; and to work effectively 
with colleagues and parents.” 
 This paper will measure these sparsely measured characteristics using the teacher effectiveness survey. 
This can be seen as a contribution to the literature because this tool has not been used to measure 
teacher productivity through econometric analysis. While some may argue against the use of this tool 
due to its reliance on the subjectivity of the students, in the United States this tool is regularly used to 
evaluate teachers because it keeps them accountable both students and other key stakeholders. 
Lagos State is the most economically important state of Nigeria. Asides its economic importance, Lagos 
is also the most populated city in West Africa – 21 million people call the bustling metropolis their 
home. The state has 339 Public Junior Secondary Schools and 319 Senior Secondary Schools (LASG 
2016). However enrolment rates remain low (about 40%), the percentage of overage students (older 
than their class average) at various levels remains high (at least 30% at any given level) (UBEC 2010) 
and The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2003) has even lamented that the situation of 
teachers in the school system in the Sub-Saharan region is so bad that it had reached “an intolerable low 
point”. Although the State has made some efforts to improve education (such as the Lagos Eko 
Secondary Education Project) with favorable outcomes, this study could help us to understand how 
incentives could influence the productivity of teachers across schools in the state.  
Using the differences in differences technique under a randomized field experiment framework, we can 
estimate differences in outcomes between a treatment and control group at baseline and end line so that 
we can attribute any differences in outcomes to the incentives given. Past literature has shown mixed 
results for conditional incentive schemes for teachers – some results are positive while others show 
counterproductive impacts. My study tests these theories using a new tool in the context of a 
developing country.   
Literature Review 
Empirical Literature Review 
Concerns about teacher productivity have led many schools in the developed world to diverge from 
traditional teacher compensation and encourage higher productivity through various types of incentives. 
In the United States, the proportion of school districts implementing performance-based incentives has 
increased by over 40% since 2004(Imberman, 2015). Although there is not much evidence in developing 
countries, some studies indicate that incentives can be effective and more cost-efficient than other 
measures. 
One of the most important contributions to this field of study (which also served as the basis for this 
paper) was made by Duflo et al. (2010). The paper made use of a randomized experiment and a 
structural model to test whether monitoring and financial incentives would reduce teacher absence and 
increase learning (reduced absence and increased learning being the measures of productivity) in rural 
India. Teacher attendance was monitored daily through the use of time-sensitive cameras, and their 
salaries were linked directly with attendance. The results showed that absenteeism by teachers fell by 
21% relative to the control group, and children's test scores increased by 0.17 standard deviations. They 
estimated a structural dynamic labor supply model and found that teachers responded strongly to the 
financial incentives and that this alone can explain the difference between the two groups.  
According to a 2009 study by Lavy, the goal of incentives for productivity is to have two major impacts. 
The first is to motivate teachers to apply more "effort," which includes quantity and quality. For 
example, to enhance quantity, teachers might spend more time on syllabus planning or after-school 
tutoring. They can enhance quality by adopting innovative teaching techniques or experimenting with 
different teaching methods. The second objective is to attract higher quality teachers. The results 
revealed that students had much higher academic performance which was mediated through changes in 
teaching methods, enhanced after-school teaching, and increased responsiveness to students' needs. 
A 2015 study by the American Institutes for Research provides evidence to support the use of student 
surveys in measuring teaching effectiveness. The main points revealed by the research were: 
• Students have substantial everyday interaction with teachers, resultant in peculiar perceptions 
and assessments of teacher behaviors. Furthermore, student ratings are often consistent from 
year to year. 
• Student evaluations are a legitimate and credible source of data. 
• Student assessments are more correlated with student achievement than principal evaluations 
and teachers’ self-assessments. 
• Students demographic characteristics (e.g. expected or obtained course grade, pupil gender, 
GPA, subject matter) did not influence teacher scores. 
• Student surveys provide expedient and detailed feedback in ways that alternative measures such 
as grades and test scores do not. 
• Appropriate use of student feedback by teachers can result in an enhanced teaching and learning 
environment. 
It is noteworthy to observe the dearth of evidence for non-monetary incentives, thereby emphasizing 
the contribution of this particular study to the field. A World Bank and HDP policy research paper by 
Dang and King (2016) examines how incentives, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, influence teacher 
effort in Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The authors estimated measures of teacher effort which had 
been previously overlooked in the literature such as the number of hours that teachers spend preparing 
for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring classes. The estimation results show that teachers 
increase effort in response to non-pecuniary incentives. 
Another momentous contribution to this literature is a cross-country study by Woessman (2010) that 
utilized data for about 190,000 students across 28 OECD countries to provide evidence on the link 
between salary adjustments for teacher performance (at the national level) and student achievement on 
the 2003 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test. This study is crucial because 
the effects of performance-related teacher pay include long-run incentive and teacher-sorting processes 
that may evade experimental studies but are captured in cross-country comparisons. The results showed 
that using teacher salary adjustments to reward great performance is significantly associated with 
mathematical, science, and reading achievement in the sample. Specifically, students in countries that 
adjust teacher salaries for exceptional performance score about 25% higher on the international math 
test than students in countries without teacher performance pay, after controlling extensively for 
student, school, and country measures.  
While the study mentioned above deals with higher income countries, Masino and Nino-Zarazua (2016) 
review several empirical studies to determine what works to improve the quality of student learning in 
developing countries. 38 carefully selected studies were included for analysis in the systematic review, 
and the researchers classified the studies based on their drivers of change of education quality including: 
(1) supply-side capability interventions that operate by providing physical and human resources, and 
learning materials; (2) policies that through incentives seek to influence behavior and intertemporal 
preferences of teachers, households, and students; (3) bottom-up and top-down participatory and 
community management interventions, which operate through decentralization reforms, knowledge 
diffusion, and increased community participation in the management of education systems. The review 
revealed that interventions in developing countries are more effective at boosting student performance 
when social norms and intertemporal choices are factored into the design of policies, and when two or 
more drivers of change are combined.  
Many researchers have explored the impact of incentives on the academic performance of students. 
Imberman and Lovenheim (2015) estimated the impact of monetary incentive strength on student 
achievement under a group-based teacher incentive pay program. The idea of grouping the teachers 
introduces an additional peer pressure treatment which allows teachers to hold each other accountable. 
Awards were based on the performances of students within a grade, school and subject by using a share 
of students in a grade-subject enrolled in a teacher's classes. The results show comprehensively that 
teachers respond to incentives when the stakes are high enough, and student achievement rises in 
response to stronger group incentives as a result of increases in teacher effort.  
Figlio and Kenny (2006) also studied Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance in the 
USA. The results showed that test scores are higher in schools with individual financial incentives for 
good performance. The effect was strongest in schools that may have weaker parental monitoring 
mechanisms. Further, the results revealed that the relation between teacher incentives and student 
performance could be attributed to either better schools adopting teacher incentives or teacher 
incentives causing more effort from teachers. In a 2005 World Bank study, Vegas and Umansky present 
a simplified schema of 7 major components of an effective system to attract, retain and motivate highly 
qualified teachers in multiple Latin American countries. The study focuses mostly on 1) teacher 
incentives that impact teachers and how long they remain in the field; and, 2) incentives that affect the 
work teachers do in the classroom.  
Further, some researchers are interested in the dichotomy between impacts of these pay for performance 
schemes in private versus public schools, with majority of research in this field indicating that private 
schools have effectively adopted these schemes with positive impacts. One particularly interesting study 
in this field (Ballou, 2001) showed that the schemes are more successful in private schools because the 
rewards given to teachers are not trivial (and are sparsely given). Moreover, private schools do not 
suffer certain circumstances peculiar to the public education system, especially the opposition of teacher 
unions.  
One of the major arguments against incentives schemes for teachers is that extrinsic incentives will 
displace intrinsic motivation. This phenomenon is known as motivational crowding out. It occurs when 
introducing an incentive for a task provokes a loss of intrinsic motivation. Several researchers have 
specifically explored this phenomenon in the context of education by trying to understand how teachers 
react to incentives (Glewwe et al. – 2010, Figlio and Winicki – 2002, Figlio and Getzler – 2002). 
The most noteworthy of these studies is Jacob and Levitt (2013)’s research which investigated the 
prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating under incentives schemes in Chicago public schools. The 
authors develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected 
test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. Their results 
estimate that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a 
minimum of 4 to 5 % of elementary school classrooms annually and the frequency of cheating responds 
strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives. Summarily, the results highlight the fact that high-
powered incentive systems, especially those with bright-line rules, may induce unexpected behavioral 
distortions such as cheating. 
Some researchers have even found negative and null impacts of incentive schemes on student outcomes. 
One of such is Gleizerman & Seifullah (2012) which discovered negative impacts of incentives schemes 
on test scores of students in the teacher incentive performance scheme known as the Teacher 
Advancement Program in Chicago, Illinois. Springer et al. (2012) find no significant effects on the 
achievement of students or the attitudes and practices of teachers in a New York City program where 
bonuses were awarded to teams of middle school teachers based on their joint contribution to student 
test score gains. In conclusion, incentives have been known to have mixed results and must be carefully 
calibrated to attain optimal outcomes.   
 
 
 
Theoretical Background 
Incentives are not a new idea in economics and have been incorporated into several models that explain 
human behavior including Principal-Agent Theory, Labor supply theory, Risk theory, etc. In this 
section of my paper, I will explore the two major areas of theory that apply to this field of research and 
help us to understand how these theories inform our empirical findings.  The first part of this section 
will detail theories of incentives and the second section will detail theories of labor productivity. 
Overview of the Theory of Incentives 
The notion of incentives in economics can be traced as far back as 1776, where Adam Smith discussed 
the concept in his writings on the determination of wages. Although he never actually used the term 
"incentives," Smith noted that in agricultural contexts, workmen were "apt to overwork themselves, and 
to ruin their health and constitution in a few years." if they were paid liberally for their work. 
Incentives become necessary in any context when the objectives of a planner (e.g., principal, 
government) do not coincide with the objectives of the members of society (we will refer to them as 
agents). Usually, the planner cares about what the agents do and what they know, i.e., the objective 
function of the planner is dependent on the agents' information and behavior. Therefore, to encourage 
agents to behave in accordance with the planner's well-defined objectives, the planner will choose an 
incentive scheme with rules that will specify his behavior by his perception of the agents' actions and 
information. 
The choice of the specific incentive scheme becomes more difficult for the planner if either some/all of 
the agents' payoff-relevant information is unknown or if the planner cannot observe agents' actions 
perfectly. The first scenario creates the problem of adverse selection, where individuals who do not plan 
on aligning with the objectives of the planner are thought to be complying. The second scenario, on the 
other hand, creates the issue of moral hazard, where the agents do not fully comply with the planner's 
objectives due to a lack of efficient monitoring. In the end, the planner chooses an incentive scheme 
which will maximize his payoff subject to the constraint that, given this scheme, agents will maximize 
their objective functions. What it means for the agents to maximize their objective function becomes 
more complex as the number of agents increases, creating a strategic game where the planner must now 
optimize subject to the agents being in equilibrium. 
A rent extraction-efficiency tradeoff exists where the incentive scheme must elicit the agents' private 
information to efficiently achieve the planner's objectives. The issue also arises where the incentive 
scheme must incorporate full monitoring to efficiently achieve the planner's objectives. This can only be 
done by giving up a costly information rent to the privately informed agent or a rent to another agent 
for monitoring purposes. At the optimal second-best scenario, the planner trades-off his desire to attain 
efficiency against the costly rent given up to the agent. 
Recent developments in incentive theory have also focused on loss aversion as a tool in designing 
incentives schemes, with some scholars even proposing that it could eliminate the rent extraction-
efficiency tradeoff that traditional incentive schemes present.  Loss aversion works so that instead of 
being rewarded for complying with the planner's objectives, agents are penalized for acting otherwise. It 
makes sense that agents will work to avoid the penalizations because empirical tests suggest that people 
commonly value a loss more than an equal gain by a factor of 2 to 4 or more (see, e.g., Kahneman et al. 
1990). Evidence of such effects has come from both experimental and non-experimental settings 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Kahneman et al. 1991) 
The nature of an incentive scheme greatly impacts its efficacy in incentivizing agents. Another area of 
interest to economists has been the efficacy of individual incentive schemes relative to group incentive 
schemes. Individual incentive schemes reward individual achievements while group schemes require 
teamwork and collaboration for the entire group to be rewarded. While both types of schemes have 
benefits as well as drawbacks, there is no perfect answer to which the best is. 
Ladley et al. (2015) studied the impact of individual versus group rewards on work group performance 
and cooperation. The authors used computational social methods and Agent-Based Models to simulate 
work group interactions as different forms of iterated games. Group-based systems were found to 
outperform individual based and mixed systems, producing more cooperative behavior, the best-
performing groups and individuals in most types of interaction games. Barnes et al. (2011) also studied 
this conflict between group versus individual incentives, postulating that trying to mix the two types of 
schemes puts team members in a social dilemma, leading them to focus on the individually based 
component. The authors found that in comparison to group-based only incentives, mixed 
individual/group incentives lead team members to perform faster but less accurately and focus on their 
own task work to the detriment of the group.  
Another area of incentive theory that overlaps with our research occurs where incentives are looked at 
in relation to compensation (wages). Well-calibrated incentives have been found to be effective 
motivators of employees in a cornucopia of empirical studies; however, the nature of these incentives is a 
major point of disagreement amongst economists. Baker et al. (1988) was the first paper in the field of 
economics that looked into this relationship. According to the authors, the first issue that arises with 
pay for performance schemes lies in performance measurement, which can either be objective or 
subjective. Each of these options has pros and cons, but both are still used to date. Promotion-Based 
incentives must also be compared to Bonus-Based incentives because while Promotions are less costly 
than bonuses, they are usually not as effective. 
Theories of Labor Productivity 
Microeconomic theory implies that wages are closely related to the marginal productivity of labor. 
Specifically, theory suggests a clear relationship between productivity, wages and labor demand, in 
which wages correspond to the marginal productivity of labor and can be derived from the profit-
maximizing behavior of firms. In reality, however, wages are not exactly equal to productivity, with 
historical data showing a wage-productivity gap that has widened progressively from the mid-1990's to 
date. The development of this gap has been accompanied by important changes in the way businesses 
compensate their employees, including the use of bonuses, incentives, etc. 
Along the same vein, economists have extensively explored the impact of this wage-productivity gap 
and wage inequality on the productivity of labor. One of the most comprehensive investigations of this 
relationship was done by Policardo et al. (2014), with the findings revealing that wage inequality 
measured by a Gini index has a negative effect "ceteris paribus" on a country's labor productivity. That 
is, more wage inequality implies less labor productivity. It is important to note that the countries used 
in this study were all OECD countries, and so the results may differ in different contexts.  
An important development of the simple neoclassical model incorporates a concept known as efficiency 
wages, which rejects the idea that wages are associated with the marginal productivity of workers. In 
contrast, this model argues that paying higher-than-market wages can be a rational choice for firms, 
e.g., to increase the work effort of employees. In the world set out in simple efficiency wage models, 
more than one type of worker exists. The workers are classified as: 
• ‘productive workers’ whose utility is based (positively) on wages, but is also linked (negatively) 
to their work effort and to the likelihood of losing their job (and becoming reliant on benefits); 
• ‘shirking workers’ who earn the same wage with less work effort, but who face a higher risk of 
job loss if their employer discovers the ‘shirking,' and therefore a higher risk of reliance on 
unemployment benefits, with lower utility.  
This model leads to an equilibrium where wages are set at the level at which workers decide not to 
‘shirk.' This implies that wages will be higher: a) the higher the effort the firms try to extract from 
workers; b) the higher the alternative utility from, e.g., unemployment benefits; and c) the smaller the 
probability that firms discover the shirking. 
The most famous shirking efficiency wage model is Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) where the shirking of the 
worker is not easy to monitor and shirking is easier than putting effort in. Thus, firms claim to decrease 
the probability of shirking by paying higher wages than the market clearing wages as the worker will 
lose a higher paid job. The intuition is that if all firms set the same wage and there is no unemployment, 
the worker simply puts no effort in at all, and if he/she is caught when shirking, the worker will get the 
same wage in another job, and there is no risk of unemployment. By paying a higher wage, losing a job 
may end the worker in an unemployment status or a lower wage job. The risk of unemployment, the 
higher wage in the current job and low unemployment benefit all decrease the outside opportunity for 
the worker. 
According to Shapiro and Stiglitz, the wage at which the worker will choose not to shirk will be when 
the present value of the utility from not shirking is greater than the utility from not shirking and can be 
seen in the formula below: 
𝑤 ≥ 𝑟𝑉𝑈 + (𝑟 + 𝑏 + 𝑞)
𝑒
𝑞
≡ ?̂? 
The equation implies a direct positive relationship between the discount rate, r; the required effort level, 
e; the utility gained from being unemployed; VU, and the exogenous quitting rate, b, such that as these 
increase, the wage needed for workers not to shirk will also increase. We also see an inverse relationship 
between the optimal wage and the probability of being caught, q, so that as the probability of being 
caught increases, the wage needed to discourage shirking will decrease. 
Furthermore, the productivity of labor in the public sector is often seen as being a polar opposite of 
productivity in the private sector, especially in under developed countries. Public sector employees are 
often disengaged from their jobs, with the problem manifesting in two main ways. First, disengaged 
employees may be less committed to their work and less productive as a result. Second, employees who 
lack clarity about organizational and personal goals, lack autonomy or do not believe that they are 
heard, are less likely to become active partners in redesigning their jobs for higher productivity 
working. (Pwc & Demos, 2014) 
Baumol (1966) hypothesized that the technology of the public sector is labor-intensive relative to that of 
the private sector because the type of production undertaken leaves little scope for increases in 
productivity and that makes it difficult to substitute capital for labor. For example, hospitals need a 
minimum number of nurses and doctors per patient, and maximum class sizes place lower limits on 
teacher numbers in schools. 
Regardless of the framework and underlying assumptions that may be used to evaluate productivity, all 
economists can agree that productivity and compensation (wages) are intrinsically linked so that one 
informs the other and vice versa. It is therefore essential for us to understand how we can manipulate 
wages to directly drive up productivity and indirectly impact economic growth in the long run. 
 
Method & Data 
The main hypotheses being tested are as follows: 
H0- Incentives have no significant impact on teacher effort among public secondary school teachers in 
Lagos State 
H1- Incentives have a significant impact on teacher effort among public secondary school teachers in 
Lagos State 
This research made use of primary data collected from 10 Public Secondary Schools in Lagos State in 
the final quarter of the 2016/2017 school year. Surveyors made use of a Teacher effectiveness survey 
with 43 questions (all scaled from 1 to 6 with 1 being the lowest value and six the highest) which 
allowed students to evaluate their teachers' "effort" under seven broad categories: 
1. Presentation of Content 
2. Clarity of Expectations or Directions 
3. Helpfulness/Availability 
4. Usefulness/Clarity of Feedback on Performance 
5. Encouragement of Participation/Discussion 
6. Motivation 
7. Overall Teaching Effectiveness 
 
Simple additive indices are created to compound the questions in the survey into each of these broad 
headers to avoid having too many dependent variables by adding together the responses for relevant 
questions and multiplying by their mean. A final overall index variable was also created which 
compounds all 43 questions in the survey into one score. This overall index will be referred to as the 
‘Final Score.' 
Lagos State has six educational districts in total. Two districts were randomly selected from the 
pool (Eti-Osa and Lagos Mainland), and our six treatment schools were then randomly selected from 
the Eti Osa district, and four control schools were chosen from the other. This was done to prevent 
significant spillover effects even within the districts. The survey was administered at baseline and end 
line (a 4-week window) in the randomly selected treatment and control schools to enable us to isolate 
the impact of our incentive treatment on the outcomes of interest. 6 of the schools in our sample were 
treatment schools that either received monetary, near-monetary or non-monetary rewards. The other 
four schools were used as our counterfactual control schools. Our treatment variable is simply an 
indicator variable where 1 indicates treated schools and 0 indicates the control schools.   
 Figure A: Map of Lagos State (sample areas are circled) 
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Control- Lagos 
Mainland 
(1170 students) 
Monetary 
Treatment 
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Non-Monetary 
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School  • Ireti Junior 
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• Ireti Senior 
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High School 
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Junior High 
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Folawiyo 
Senior High 
School 
• Aje Junior 
High School 
• Mobolaji Bank 
Anthony Junior 
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• Iponri Estate 
Junior High 
School 
• Iponri Estate 
Senior High 
School 
 
The incentives were awarded to the teachers with the highest average improvement in 
effort/productivity (as measured by the above key indicators). The monetary incentive was a cash prize 
of NGN 5,000 (US $15) for each teacher. There was also a “near money” treatment arm which received 
gift cards for a popular supermarket in Lagos equal in nominal value to the monetary reward. The non-
monetary incentive was an award ceremony (with certificates and trophies) for the selected teachers in 
the school at a school-wide assembly.  
 One drawback of this data set lies in the fact that we were unable to gather demographic data (such as 
age, family income, sex, etc.) from the 162 teachers in our sample to ascertain whether the treatment 
and control groups are adequately balanced. We are simply analyzing this data under the assumption 
that the two groups are balanced because of the random selection of schools in our sample from all 
Public Secondary Schools across Lagos State which should have students and teachers that are similar 
in characteristics across the board. The lack of demographic information also means that we will be 
unable to statistically prove the parallel trends assumption which is a major underlying assumption of 
difference in difference estimation.  
Due to the lack of demographic data, I will provide some brief stylized facts that will enable us 
to compare the treatment and control schools and their local government areas to some extent: 
• There are 20-25 full-time teachers in each of the schools in our sample, including both 
treatment and control schools. 
• According to a School Census by the Lagos State Government, the teacher-pupil ratios in 
the districts where our study was carried out are 38:1 and 35:1 for Junior Secondary schools 
and 32:1 and 23:1 for Senior Secondary Schools respectively. 
• Regarding school enrolment by gender: 
 Eti-Osa District Lagos Mainland District 
Junior Secondary Schools 51.9%female, 48.1% male, 58.4% female, 41.6% male, 
Senior Secondary Schools 51.1% female, 48.9% male, 52.6% female, 47.4% male, 
• Regarding the demographic characteristics of the local government areas: 
 Eti-Osa LGA Lagos Mainland LGA 
Population 390,800 449,900 
Population (by gender) 56% male, 44% female, 52% male, 48% female 
Age Distribution 15-64 yrs 72%, 0-14yrs 
26%, 65+years 2% 
15-64 yrs 67%, 0-14yrs 
30%, 65+years 3% 
Average Estimated Living 
Costs for a family of 2+2 
US$184 US$144 
 
We can, therefore, say that the schools should be fairly well balanced in terms of characteristics. 
Model Specification 
 The key research idea we attempt to investigate is the impact of incentives on teacher effort 
among public secondary school teachers in Lagos State. In order to isolate the pure impact of our 
treatment, we make use of the Difference in Difference (DID) methodology. This method calculates the 
effect of a treatment (i.e., an explanatory variable or an independent variable) on an outcome (i.e., a 
response variable or dependent variable) by comparing the average change over time in the outcome 
variable for the treatment group, compared to the average change over time for the control group. In 
addition to the basic linear regression assumptions, the major underlying assumption of this method is 
the parallel trends assumption which states that the trend of the outcome variable in the counterfactual 
(or control group) must be similar to its trend in the treatment group in the absence of the treatment.  
The basic empirical model we will be estimating is: 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜌𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜇𝑖 
Where 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the performance of teacher i at time t as measured by our key 
indicators, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable which shows the treatment status of teacher i at time t 
(1 if you are in the treatment group and 0 otherwise), 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 is an indicator variable which is 1 at the end 
line and 0 at baseline and 𝛽1tells us the differential impact on teacher effort of the assigned incentive 
relative to the control group. Furthermore, the standard errors in this model are clustered at the school 
level. 
 
Results 
 
 
Figure 1 above shows the mean of the Final Score in both the treatment and control groups at baseline 
and end line across the entire sample. The figure implies an overall reduction in the mean of the Final 
score over the course of the study across all treatment arms. Figures 2 through 4 of the appendix show 
similar means for the three particular incentive groups, and we can see that the near monetary and non-
monetary responses seem to be driving this reduction in the mean. In all of the scenarios, the treatment 
4.96 4.85
1
1
.5
2
2
.5
3
3
.5
4
4
.5
5
5
.5
6
m
e
a
n
 o
f 
F
in
a
lS
c
o
re
  
Baseline Endline
Treatment Group
4.68 4.62
1
1
.5
2
2
.5
3
3
.5
4
4
.5
5
5
.5
6
m
e
a
n
 o
f 
F
in
a
lS
c
o
re
  
Baseline Endline
Control Group
Figure 1: Baseline  & Endline Mean of Final Score in Treatment (Left) and Control (Right) Groups. 
mean is significantly higher than the control means at the end line, but the difference between the 
groups varies by the type of incentive. 
Tables 1 through 4 in the Appendix shows us the all of the Difference in Difference estimates for the 
entire sample of the study. The results show that overall; the incentives have no significant impact on 
teachers in the treatment schools relative to those in the control schools. The incentives do not have 
significant effects on presentation of content, clarity of expectations, teacher’s helpfulness, usefulness of 
feedback, encouragement of participation, motivation, overall teaching effectiveness and the final 
evaluation score.  
Following the overall analysis, we must now individually look at the impacts of the three different types 
of treatments relative to the control arm. Table 2 shows us the impacts of our monetary incentives on 
the teacher's performance. Recall that the monetary incentive was a total of NGN 5,000 (US $15) for 
each teacher. According to the results, monetary incentives have no significant impacts whatsoever on 
any of our key performance indicators including presentation of content, clarity of expectations, 
teacher’s helpfulness, usefulness of feedback, encouragement of participation, motivation, overall 
teaching effectiveness and the final evaluation score. 
Table 3 shows us the impact of our near monetary incentives on the teacher’s performance. Recall that 
the near monetary incentive was a gift card for a popular supermarket in Lagos equal in value to the 
monetary reward. The results here also showed no significant effects of this near monetary incentive on 
any of our measures of teacher effort including the overarching metric – the final evaluation score. 
Finally, we look at the impact of the non-monetary incentives on the performance of teachers in 
treatment schools relative to their peers in control schools. Recall that the reward here was an award 
ceremony (with certificates and trophies) for the teachers in the school at a school-wide assembly. These 
results in Table 4 reveal that the non-monetary incentive had highly significant negative impacts on the 
usefulness of feedback, encouragement of participation, motivation and the final evaluation score. This 
result is particularly interesting because it implies that non-monetary incentives of this nature actually 
hamper teaching effectiveness – possibly by fostering unhealthy competition among the teachers to win 
awards.  
Conclusion & Recommendations 
In this paper, we are able to show that incentives do not always yield desired impacts. Overall, the 
incentives actually do more harm than good in our sample. Although monetary incentives show positive 
impacts, the effects are not statistically significant. Further, the near monetary and non-monetary 
incentives show counterproductive results, negatively impacting the performance of the teachers in 
those groups.  
However, these results are not completely surprising. There are many dissenting voices in economics 
who propose that merit-based pay for teachers will most likely do more harm than good. Lewis and 
Podgursky (2000) outline seven major issues that could arise as a result of merit-based pay schemes for 
teachers: 
1. Performance-based compensation programs encourage competition rather than collaboration 
among teachers. 
2. The Union Environment and the Collaborative Nature of Teaching are violated when some 
teachers are paid more than others. 
3. There is no clear definition of what constitutes a "good teacher." In other words, what is merit 
based upon? 
4. If student learning is the sole basis of the merit evaluation, relying on test scores can present 
major problems because teachers may be improving in other ways. (hence, my use of the 
teaching effectiveness survey) 
5. When you reward teachers for student achievement, nobody wants to teach certain kids in 
certain communities, i.e., low-income children in low-income communities.  
6. Bias and Favoritism between teachers and students, and even between teachers and school 
administration. 
7. Performance-based compensation will take from teachers the ability to teach as they wish and as 
they do best. It just requires teachers to jump through hoops. It will make everyone teach and 
behave in the same way. 
 
In the light of a few limitations to the study, we must also evaluate what could have been done better to 
improve the probability of detecting a significant effect. One major issue that is worth discussing is the 
limited period within which the study was carried out. Due to changes in the Lagos State school 
calendar, the entire study was done in 4 weeks from baseline to end line. Perhaps a longer period would 
have been able to produce more desirable results. The size/value of the incentive has also seemed to 
have significant impacts on outcomes in past studies. It is therefore possible that increasing the value of 
the incentives could have produced different results. 
In conclusion, this study has revealed that trying to incentivize people to improve their performance 
does not always work, especially in developing contexts. It is most likely that the issues that cause poor 
performance amongst government teachers in developing countries run much deeper than incentives; 
institutions and attitudes must also be reformed to experience significant changes in behavior. 
Aggressive monitoring mechanisms could also be used to complement incentives schemes (as in the 
Duflo paper) to increase the impact of these programs. This paper contributes to a small but growing 
literature that exploits structural modeling and carefully controlled randomized experiments to answer 
questions about education in the developing world. Avenues for further study exist in terms of different 
geographical contexts, various measurement tools and methodological variations. 
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Appendix 
Figure 2: Baseline & Endline Mean of Final Score in Monetary Treatment and Control Groups.  
 
Figure 3: Baseline & Endline Mean of Final Score in Near Monetary Treatment and Control Groups. 
Figure 4: Baseline & Endline Mean of Final Score in Non-Monetary Treatment and Control Groups  
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School District Baseline Endline 
Aje 
Junior  
Lagos 
Mainland 
456 456 
Falomo 
Junior  
Eti-Osa 
426 198 
Falomo 
Senior  
Eti-Osa 
317 267 
Iponri 
Junior  
Lagos 
Mainland 328 183 
Iponri 
Senior  
Lagos 
Mainland 275 178 
Ireti 
Junior  
Eti-Osa 
567 339 
Ireti 
Senior  
Eti-Osa 
183 278 
MBA 
Junior  
Lagos 
Mainland 112 138 
Wahab 
Junior  
Eti-Osa 
521 399 
Wahab 
Senior  
Eti-Osa 
198 204 
Total  3383 2640 
    
 TABLE 1: Overall Differences in Differences Estimates 
 (1) 
Presentation of 
Content 
(2) 
Clarity of 
Expectations 
(3) 
Helpfulness 
(4) 
Useful 
Feedback 
(5) 
Encouraging 
Participation 
(6) 
Motivation 
(7) 
Overall 
Teaching 
Effectiveness 
(8)  
Final 
Evaluation 
Score 
Time -0.107* -0.074 -0.113 -0.041 0.006 -0.029 -0.164 -0.058 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.16) (0.06)        
  
Treatment 0.256 0.175 0.261 0.307 0.312 0.280 0.292 0.275 
 (0.20) (0.10) (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17)        
  
DID 0.101 -0.160 0.077 -0.005 -0.140 -0.086 -0.084 -0.045 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)        
  
_cons 4.736*** 4.731*** 4.707*** 4.610*** 4.623*** 4.726*** 4.658*** 4.682*** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) 
 
(0.05) 
R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Observations 3382 3382 3382 3382 3382 3382 3382 3382 
*** Number of observations includes total number of observations at baseline and end line 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 2: Monetary Differences in Differences Estimates 
 
 (1) 
Presentation 
of Content 
(2) 
Clarity of 
Expectations 
(3) 
Helpfulness 
(4) 
Useful 
Feedback 
(5) 
Encouraging 
Participation 
(6) 
Motivation 
(7) 
Overall 
Teaching 
Effectiveness 
(8)  
Final 
Evaluation 
Score 
Time -0.107 -0.073 -0.113 -0.041 0.006 -0.029 -0.164 -0.058  
(0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.16) (0.06) 
Moneytreat -0.047 0.094 -0.008 0.028 0.132 0.092 0.205 0.060 
  (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.13) (0.18) 
DID 0.444 0.090 0.407 0.348 0.095 0.133 0.029 0.243 
  (0.34) (0.37) (0.39) (0.35) (0.43) (0.43) (0.27) (0.38) 
_cons 4.736*** 4.731*** 4.707*** 4.610*** 4.623*** 4.726*** 4.658*** 4.682*** 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) 
         
R-Squared 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Observatio
ns 
1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 
*** Number of observations includes total number of observations at baseline and end line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 3: Near Monetary Differences in Differences Estimates 
 
 (1) 
Presentation 
of Content 
(2) 
Clarity of 
Expectations 
(3) 
Helpfulness 
(4) 
Useful 
Feedback 
(5) 
Encouraging 
Participation 
(6) 
Motivation 
(7) 
Overall 
Teaching 
Effectiveness 
(8)  
Final 
Evaluation 
Score 
Time -0.107 -0.074 -0.113 -0.041 0.006 -0.030 -0.164 -0.058 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.16) (0.06) 
NearMonTreat 0.263 0.117 0.222 0.266 0.241 0.214 0.180 0.226  
(0.26) (0.14) (0.29) (0.30) (0.25) (0.23) (0.33) (0.25) 
DID -0.096 -0.222 -0.067 -0.157 -0.165 -0.096 -0.097 -0.141  
(0.22) (0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.09) (0.12) (0.20) (0.14) 
_cons 4.736*** 4.731*** 4.707*** 4.610*** 4.623*** 4.726*** 4.658*** 4.682***  
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) 
 
R-Squared 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
Observations 1913 1913 1913 1913 1913 1913 1913 1913 
*** Number of observations includes total number of observations at baseline and end line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 4: Non-Monetary Differences in Differences Estimates 
 (1) 
Presentation 
of Content 
(2) 
Clarity of 
Expectations 
(3) 
Helpfulness 
(4) 
Useful 
Feedback 
(5) 
Encouraging 
Participation 
(6) 
Motivation 
(7) 
Overall 
Teaching 
Effectiveness 
(8)  
Final 
Evaluation 
Score 
Time -0.107 -0.073 -0.113 -0.041 0.006 -0.038 -0.164 -0.058  
(0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.16) (0.06) 
NonMonTreat 0.565* 0.320** 0.582* 0.642* 0.572* 0.545* 0.495 0.549* 
  (0.21) (0.07) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.29) (0.18) 
DID -0.103 -0.386 -0.166 -0.265** -0.383*** -0.324** -0.219 -0.283* 
  (0.14) (0.27) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08) 
_cons 4.736*** 4.731*** 4.707*** 4.610*** 4.623*** 4.726*** 4.658*** 4.682*** 
  
 
R-Squared 
(0.07) 
 
0.07 
(0.04) 
 
0.03 
(0.07) 
 
0.07 
(0.06) 
 
0.06 
(0.03) 
 
0.05 
(0.05) 
 
0.05 
(0.11) 
 
0.03 
(0.05) 
 
0.07 
Observations 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
*** Number of observations includes total number of observations at baseline and end line 
 
